1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	MARK DUTKEWYCH,
5	Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 12-11073-DJC
6	V. December 12, 2013
7	STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 2:18 p.m.
8	Defendant.
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11	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DENISE J. CASPER
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
14	JOHN J. MOAKLEY U.S. COURTHOUSE
15	1 COURTHOUSE WAY
16	BOSTON, MA 02210
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PROCEEDINGS

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(The following proceedings were held in open court before the Honorable Denise J. Casper, United States
District Judge, United States District Court, District of
Massachusetts, at the John J. Moakley United States Courthouse,
1 Courthouse Way, Boston, Massachusetts, on December 12, 2013.)

THE CLERK: Civil action 12-11073, Mark Dutkewych v. Standard Insurance Company.

Would counsel please state your name for the record.

MS. RAFIK: Good afternoon, your Honor. Mala Rafik, I'm here with Steven Rosenfeld for the plaintiff, Mark Dutkewych.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel.

Good afternoon.

MR. ROSENFELD: Good afternoon.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Brooks Magratten for The Standard Insurance Company.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel.

Counsel, I know I have cross-motions for summary judgment. I have reviewed the papers, I'm prepared to hear argument. I actually don't recall which of them was filed first, but I suppose we can start with the plaintiff, then I'll give defense counsel, as well, an opportunity for argument.

MS. RAFIK: Thank you, your Honor. I wanted to just note that my client is here in the courtroom, as well, today.

With your permission, your Honor, I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MS. RAFIK: Thank you.

So I intend to address three issues today, your Honor. First, looking at the record as a whole, Mr. Dutkewych has met his burden of proving that at the only relevant time at issue in this case, June 2011, he was disabled due to a physical condition, lyme disease, and the symptoms of that condition alone.

Second, The Standard's conclusion that Mr. Dutkewych's disability was due to mental illness or fibromyalgia is not based on the substantial evidence in the record and should not be given deference by this Court.

And third, your Honor, Standard's late-in-the-day interpretation of the mental illness limitation is inconsistent with its interpretation in this case and in other cases and is a *post hoc* rationalization undeserving of deference.

First, and most important, your Honor, there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Dutkewych is disabled. He cannot work in his own occupation as an attorney, and he cannot work in any occupation. Standard fully concedes this point. The record establishes that he suffers from a debilitating illness, chronic lyme disease, or as the CDC calls it, post-treatment lyme disease syndrome. His symptoms really fall into two

camps, your Honor. The first is cognitive limitations, and the second are independently disabling physical symptoms, including joint pain and swelling, otherwise known as joint arthritis; fatigue; headaches; and visual disturbances; all of which are consistent with the clinical picture of lyme.

When he first began exhibiting these symptoms, now five years ago, lyme did not enjoy the same understanding in medicine or the prominence in the media that it enjoys today.

And that really, your Honor, is the first tragedy of this case.

Mark suffered with worsening symptoms and worsening pain with simply no relief, except the pain medication that was constantly given to him to address the symptoms but really with no insight as to their cause. He, unfortunately, became addicted to this pain medication. Depression later set in when, after seeing over 15 specialists, he was told by a rheumatologist that he simply needed to will himself to get better. He was hospitalized, he underwent ECT treatment, and lived in residential treatment facilities for several months before being correctly diagnosed and treated.

After he began receiving IV antibiotic treatment for lyme and an IV was inserted in both his arm and his chest,

Mark's mental health symptoms began to subside, and he has been able to maintain sobriety since March 2010.

The second tragedy in this case is that Mark's diagnosis came far too late. By the time he began receiving

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         treatment, the lyme infection had destroyed Mark's body, the
         body of a one-time American athlete, and it has destroyed his
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         brain, a mind that had led him to a successful career in public
         finance at Mintz Levin.
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                  Your Honor, Mark is now totally disabled due to
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         chronic lyme disease, and it's a total disability that
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         Standard's own life insurance department acknowledges is due to
         chronic lyme. Standard's disability division, however,
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         attempts to split hairs, simply in an attempt to avoid
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         liability. It acknowledges that Mark suffers from physically
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         disabling symptoms, but it claims that chronic lyme just isn't
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         real. As a result --
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                  THE COURT: But, counsel, isn't there a fair amount of
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         evidence in the record disputing that diagnosis?
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                  MS. RAFIK: Of chronic lyme, your Honor, with respect
         to Mark or just generally?
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                  THE COURT: As to -- well, both, both.
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                  MS. RAFIK: Okay.
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                  So let me take first the more general issue of chronic
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               So there certainly is a political debate out there, your
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         Honor, regarding chronic lyme or there has been a political
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         debate. I would say that the sands are very much shifting in
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         that regard.
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                  In 2013, for instance, four cases dealt with the issue
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         of chronic lyme and whether chronic lyme existed and whether it
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was disabling. In all four cases the courts found, based on the CDC criteria, that, number one, chronic lyme did exist; and that, number two, the individuals were disabled as a result.

Similarly, in medicine you're seeing a constant change in the way medicine is treating chronic lyme, as evidenced, actually, in the medical literature we've included in this record in this case. But more importantly with respect to Mark and really the four corners of this record, your Honor, there are at least eight objective tests that support the existence of chronic lyme.

The first is that Mark has been diagnosed on two Western blot tests as having chronic lyme. In the <u>Gent</u> case in the 1st Circuit, the court found important that the plaintiff had never been diagnosed on Western blot with lyme disease.

Mr. Dutkewych has two positive Western blot tests.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Mr. Dutkewych underwent a spinal tap at Brigham & Women's Hospital, it was read at Brigham & Women's Hospital, and it showed elevated protein in the fluid. These results were -- this test was really ordered by Mark's primary care physician, Dr. K.

Isselbacher, but the results shared with three lyme experts that have no involvement in this case: a doctor from Johns Hopkins, a doctor from Columbia School of Medicine, and a doctor from Beth Israel. All three of those doctors concurred based on that spinal tap that Mr. Dutkewych had chronic lyme

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disease and decided to insert is a port into his arm and treat him with intravenous IV fluids.

There's a number of other tests, your Honor. There's a SPECT scan that shows diminished blood flow to the brain that Dr. Raxlen, who is a lyme expert, he's treated over 4,000 individuals with lyme disease, he felt that the results of the SPECT scan were consistent with chronic lyme. There's an abnormal EEG that was consistent with cerebral disorder that was felt to be consistent with chronic lyme. There is also -- there's also -- just one last point I'd like to make, there's also Dr. Trempe, who's a Harvard professor, who found that Mark had changes in his vision that's consistent with what he sees with chronic lyme. These are indisputable objective tests.

More importantly, your Honor, the CDC has said, and they just revised their clinical definition of lyme, they have said very clearly that lyme is a clinical diagnosis, it is based on clinical exam.

So there are at least seven doctors who have examined Mark and who have determined, based on his clinical presentation, that he suffers from chronic lyme.

To answer your question, your Honor, on the other side we have Drs. Dattwyler and Sigal, both of whom were retained -- both of whom were retained by Standard who found otherwise, and they're really the contrary evidence that your Honor is referring to.

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THE COURT: And isn't -- weren't there negative tests, counsel?

MS. RAFIK: There were. There were a number of negative ELISA tests. So the way that lyme works is the first test that's offered is the ELISA test. It's often -- I think the statistic -- it's in our brief -- but I believe it's over 60 percent inaccurate. It often shows a false positive, it can also show a false negative. The next step is to go to the Western blot, which is much more sensitive to the existence of lyme.

But I do want to caution your Honor that the CDC has said that while testing is helpful for the diagnosis, it is not necessary to make a diagnosis of lyme. And this is where I think a lot of the misunderstanding has really occurred, both in this case and in prior cases before this year. The CDC issues two separate sets of criteria, one is surveillance criteria, and it's part of their attempt to sort of gather information as to how many people nationally suffer from lyme. The surveillance criteria require positive blood tests to demonstrate the existence of lyme. They're trying to capture sort of — they're trying to measure how many people have lyme in the country. On the other hand, they're very clear that the diagnostic criteria do not require positive blood tests. What they require is a clinical examination.

It's important to note, your Honor, however, that

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Mr. Dutkewych, in the record -- the record shows that

Mr. Dutkewych actually even meets the surveillance criteria.

When he was initially diagnosed with lyme by Dr. Hubbuch, she sent his lyme -- the Western blot to the Mass. Department of Public Health, who reviewed the results of the clinical exam and the results of Western blot and certified that Mark met the clinical criteria, the surveillance criteria, for chronic lyme as established by the CDC, and sent his results on to the CDC as a confirmed case of lyme.

THE COURT: Counsel, I guess one of the questions I have for you, and isn't this a similarity with the <u>Gent</u> case in regards to isn't there evidence in the record here of a history of other mental conditions and disorders that would weaken the probability of lyme disease?

MS. RAFIK: Thank you for asking that question, your Honor. I welcome the opportunity to respond to that.

Mark had a history of OCD. It was diagnosed in 2004, and it really manifested itself in a desire to be neat and clean. He sought treatment with Dr. Paul Serrano at MGH, and in 2004 had a number of visits, I believe, like, 14 visits. But as the years progressed, those visits diminished down to one. That was his history of mental illness. He was also 2001 in a severe car accident, where a man on heroin killed somebody else after crossing a median and Mark was hit by a car. He took Vicodin for six months or I think it was OxyContin for six

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months to address his symptoms, he was flat on his back following that accident; but after six months he proactively engaged in a PT session three to four hours a day to get better and he did and he was off his meds. That's his history of substance abuse and mental health treatment, although he had some sporadic depression, but nothing -- depression with a small D throughout life because of unhappiness with his job. But that was it before he was bitten by a tick in 2007.

And what happened in 2007, your Honor, is that he started having all these physical symptoms. He was bleeding from different orifices, he was having pain, he was dropping things, he was clumsy, he was forgetting things, he was extraordinarily tired, and he went from specialist to specialist, rheumatologist to gastroenterologist; and all anybody could say to him is, We don't know. We can offer a differential diagnosis but we really don't know what the cause is. And what every single doctor did is give him pain medication, and it was that pain medication that caused him to become addicted. It was the only thing that he had that helped his symptoms. So when he was ultimately -- when he was ultimately admitted to McLean Hospital, he said to McLean Hospital, Substance abuse has been the biggest cause of the problems in my life. But what he was referring to was the arrest that had occurred the day before and the substance abuse that had destroyed his life in the year prior. After all, he

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had lost his job, he had lost his health, and he had been told by doctors, We have no idea what's wrong with you. But that substance abuse and that depression that set in at that time stood alone, your Honor, it wasn't a part of long-term history, as Standard would like to portray Mark. Certainly there are references in the record to Mark doing drugs in college; contrary to what Standard says, that drug use ended in college, the records are very clear. We've made those points in our brief. But this history of mental illness and substance abuse occurred in the context of the missed diagnosis. And when he was correctly diagnosed, those symptoms subsided to the degree that he went off Flexapro in 2010 because he was doing so well. And he hasn't used, since March 2010, any substance for pain. The second point I'd like to make just went right out of my head, but there is a second point to answer your

question --

THE COURT: But I guess, and I think there is a difference in opinion between the parties in terms of what time period I should be looking at. I understand your argument to be that I need to look at 2011.

MS. RAFIK: That's right, June 2011.

THE COURT: As of the condition of 2011. What, if anything, would you have me make of the decision about the long-term disability claim being allowed in 2009 based on his mental conditions?

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MS. RAFIK: Certainly. And that was -- actually, you took me right to the point I was going to make, your Honor.

The <u>Gent</u> case -- this is where the similarity is, in the <u>Gent</u> case of course. Mrs. Gent filed her claim based on psychiatric conditions, as Mark did. But the difference in the two cases is one year later Mrs. Gent was diagnosed with lyme disease. She was bitten by a tick one year into her claim. She didn't start her claim with lyme disease, she only had a mental illness.

In Mark's case he started his claim with lyme disease and with mental illness. If you look at Standard, Standard has a new claim intake form, and on their new claim intake form when they approved Mr. Dutkewych's claim for short-term disability, they made the point that his psychiatric condition was more prominent at the time, which it most certainly was, his doctors were attempting to deal with his depression and addiction issues that had occurred in search of a cure, but it was very clear in their notes that lyme had been referenced as a possible cause of his symptoms. He had started IV antibiotic treatments -- not IV antibiotics, I'm sorry, oral antibiotics at the time his claim was filed, and his physical condition occurred at the same time, or the claim was filed with both in mind.

The second point to make here, your Honor, is that Mr. Dutkewych's lyme disease, physical condition, is, in fact,

what caused his addiction and his depression, unlike the <u>Gent</u> case, they're completely isolated conditions.

Moreover, in the <u>Gent</u> case, your Honor, there was -Mrs. Gent's own doctors couldn't concur as to what was causing
her symptoms. Some of her own doctors thought that her illness
was due to mental illness as opposed to lyme disease.

In Mr. Dutkewych's case there are three psychiatric providers, Dr. Statlender, Dr. Raxlen, and Dr. Shea, and all of whom have opined that Mr. Dutkewych does not suffer from disabling mental health conditions, period.

More importantly, The Standard's only psychiatric reviewer, and he was a neuropsychologist, Dr. Gant, is the only doctor that Standard retained to review the entire file. He stated unequivocally that he could not -- that there was no limitations due to a psychiatric condition, and that he could not render a determination as to whether or not Mr. Dutkewych even had a psychiatric condition that was disabling.

There's not one shred of evidence in this record, your Honor, that supports a finding that Mr. Dutkewych -- by any doctor -- was disabled as of June 2011 from a psychiatric condition, unlike the <u>Gent</u> case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RAFIK: I will make one more point, your Honor --

THE COURT: Can I just interrupt?

MS. RAFIK: Oh, of course.

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THE COURT: I recall that Social Security has made a determination of disability, and what was the timing of that?

What was the -- both the timing of that decision and what time period does it cover?

MS. RAFIK: So we applied for Social Security for Mr. Dutkewych immediately at the time he became disabled, so we handled his application, and that was in early 2009 is when his application went in. Social Security Administration found in 2010, and I believe it was in June of 2010, that Mr. Dutkewych suffered from -- was disabled due to both depression and due to lyme disease. But what they said -- and both conditions were The medical records that they had to make the determination regarding the depression, and they list this in the opinion that's in the record, your Honor, is his psychiatric treatment records from McLean Hospital and from Cambridge Hospital that were in 2008 and early in 2009. They didn't have anymore current psychiatric records. The lyme disease they found to be severe, but they felt, or Judge Fallon felt that his psychiatric condition would probably resolve within a year, and that was clear in the opinion.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. RAFIK: You're welcome, your Honor.

So if I may, your Honor, I'd like to make just -you've actually helped me with my second point, but I'd like to
make just a couple of more points with respect to Standard's

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discretion and its reliance on Dr. Sigal, Dr. Dattwyler, and Dr. Gant.

Dr. Sigal, Dr. Sigal's entire report is sort of based on the promise that chronic lyme doesn't exist. He cites to no authority in that regard, and he does nothing to refute

Mr. Dutkewych's treatment providers' diagnosis of lyme, except to say there's this whole group of doctors out there that make a living out of telling people they have chronic lyme when they really don't.

Mr. Dutkewych's treatment providers span the entire gamut up and down the East Coast, and it really defies logic to think they're in cahoots together to make money off of Mr. Dutkewych. Regardless, Dr. Sigal provides no medical support for his report.

Dr. Dattwyler is really the more sort of thorough report here in this case that Standard based its decision on.

I was looking at Dr. Dattwyler's report today. He has about 45 different citations, 45 different footnotes, and the vast majority of those footnotes are from medical research that was done in the 1990s.

For instance, Dr. Dattwyler says -- and this is a big part of his claim that Mr. Dutkewych never had lyme -- he said, Well, Mr. Dutkewych never had the rash, the EM rash that is required to diagnose lyme. He says that happens in 90 percent of people. The citation he uses is from 1998. The CDC said in

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2011 and it's as of today, I checked its website today, that 70 to 80 percent of people never -- get the rash but the rest don't. And in fact, for the surveillance criteria, actually having the rash is not necessary for a diagnosis of lyme.

Moreover, he says you have to have -- that psychiatric manifestations of lyme aren't credible, they don't exist.

Again, he's citing to case studies from the 1990s. That's been absolutely reputed. The medical evidence in the record from the late 2000s says quite otherwise.

He also says that neurological lyme disease is rare based on investigations from 2001 to 2006. Just this year the CDC says we've been underestimating by 300,000 the number of people who have lyme.

The problem with Dr. Dattwyler's report, your Honor, is that his medicine is outdated. And he ultimately never deals with the clinical -- with Mark's clinical picture. He makes three references in his report that Mark doesn't meet the clinical picture of lyme, but if you look at his report, he never explains why. Three times he makes that blanket statement, but he never says, Well, what symptoms does Mark have that don't meet the clinical picture? In fact, Mark's doctors, Dr. Raxlen, Dr. Hubbuch, Dr. Ruiz, both painstakingly did clinical evaluations of Mark and said, He meets the clinical picture of lyme, he meets the picture that we see in the thousands of patients that we see with lyme disease, and he

meets the clinical picture as supported by the CDC.

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The 1st Circuit has sort of repeatedly said, Look, if there's contrary evidence in the file, discretion always wins, discretion is the trump card, but it has also very clearly said that you have to acknowledge and respond to the contrary medical evidence. It's not enough to say — to throw up your hands and say, Well, there's conflicting evidence, we win, discretion trumps. You have to actually deal with the evidence that's in front of you, and I actually think —

THE COURT: Even if, as you suggest, the medical studies and medicine's understanding of the condition have evolved since Standard made its decision?

MS. RAFIK: Yes. But, your Honor, the medical studies are in the record. So the medical studies that we cite to are in the record. Certainly the 300,000-person cite I just made to your Honor is not in the record, but everything else I've said is in the record. And we have included in the record medical literature from the late 2000s that supports the existence of chronic lyme, unequivocally supports it.

Your Honor, Judge Woodlock just recently in Petrone
said -- when thinking about this concept of conflicting medical evidence and discretion, he said, An administrator cannot simply ignore contrary evidence or engage only with that evidence which supports his conclusion. In our opinion, your Honor, that's precisely what happened here. If you look at

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Dr. Dattwyler's and Sigal's reports, they don't ever look at Dr. Raxlen's record or Dr. Raxlen's clinical evaluations or Dr. Ruiz' or any of the evidence set forth by Mark. They simply take the evidence — they simply just write off the doctors as quacks hurrying to make some money, but they never deal with the evidence, and that's the problem with their reviews here. It's not enough. You can't hide behind the shield of discretion, unless you do the review that's required by ERISA.

So just one final point, if I may, your Honor -THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RAFIK: -- at the 11th hour The Standard raised in its reply brief a new argument that hasn't been raised before in this case.

So they said that if you have cognitive limitations that are disabling, regardless of their cause, whether it's physical or mental, then your case is limited to two years of benefits under this plan.

This is a post hoc rationalization, your Honor, and the 1st Circuit in <u>Glista v. Unum</u> shut down such post hoc justifications, that the insurance company can't come up with any justification at any time to justify the denial of benefits.

During the internal appeals process in this case, I specifically asked the appeals handler, Linda Wheeler, I asked

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her, If someone has cognitive limitations that are derived from a physical cause, does that -- is that claim limited to two years? And she said, No. Her notes are very clearly detailed in the file, they've been cited in our briefs, and I have copies here today. But she said, If you have cognitive limitations that are due to a physical cause, whether it's lyme disease or cancer, then you have a physical disease or injury that is payable beyond two years.

The Standard now argues in its brief that she's wrong. She is not a lawyer, she's wrong, even though she was the person responsible for interpreting the policy and the plan in this case. But what doesn't make sense here, your Honor, is if The Standard's interpretation is correct, their late-in-the-day interpretation is correct, there simply wouldn't have been any need to further investigate Mark's case after the neuropsych testing that was done by Dr. Shea in May 2011 found him to be totally disabled from cognitive limitations of lyme. The case should have stopped there. There would have been no need to spend \$25,000 on Dr. Dattwyler and on Dr. Gant's review to determine the cause of Mr. Dutkewych's cognitive limitations, it would have been unnecessary.

Similarly, such an interpretation of the policy is nonsensical. It would mean that anybody who suffers from any sort of physical condition that causes disabling cognitive limitations, whether it's cancer, a traumatic brain injury,

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would be limited to two years of benefits. It's not what the policy calls for, it's not in the contract.

Your Honor, in preparation for this argument, I went to Pacer and I tried to pull as many cases that I could find where this issue had come up, this policy provision. What I did pull was the case where all the briefs in the Schwob case that Standard cites to where this provision was at issue, and I found another case called Oster that was decided in 2011 where the man did, in fact, suffer from a traumatic brain injury and his only disabling symptoms were cognitive. In neither one of those cases did The Standard raise the policy interpretation it's now raising at the 11th hour in this case. Because it's a post hoc rationalization, because it's ERISA implementing regulations that require meaningful dialogue during the internal appeals process, this Court cannot just give deference to this new policy interpretation by The Standard.

THE COURT: What relief do you seek here? Meaning, are you seeking remand or -- is that what you're seeking?

MS. RAFIK: No, your Honor. We're seeking an award of benefits here, and I'll tell you why remand is inappropriate in this case.

If your Honor determines -- well, let me start here. There's no dispute that Mr. Dutkewych is disabled, unlike the vast majority of ERISA cases your Honor likely sees. So if your Honor determines that chronic lyme could have caused or

caused Mr. Dutkewych's disability, then there's simply no reason to remand this case, benefits can be awarded.

Secondly, your Honor, this case is 51 pages -- 5,100 pages long. There's no dispute here. There's no claim that there is a procedural irregularity that would necessitate a remand. The record is what the record is, and if Mr. Dutkewych is disabled, then, as Standard's Life Insurance Division says, it's due to chronic lyme disease, then he should be awarded the benefits he is due.

Thank you, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Counsel, I'll hear from you.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Thank you, your Honor.

The case presents a very long and detailed factual record, but the legal issue, I think, is fairly narrow. The parties have briefed the facts on this extensively.

It's clear that Mr. Dutkewych, in some respects, has been quite accomplished, both as an athlete and as an associate who was employed in one of the larger firms in town. In other respects, however, he's been burdened with a terrible history of depression, anxiety, drug addition leading to criminal convictions, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and fibromyalgia. His history includes both inpatient and outpatient psychiatric hospitalization programs, self-mutilation, and contemplated suicide.

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His last day of work as an associate was October 3 of 2008. He applied to Standard for benefits under their long-term disability plan, and there's no dispute Standard paid for two years and then terminated benefits under the disability's subject-to-limited-pay-periods provision of the policy.

I think it's important at this point to take a step back and ask a fundamental question: Why at the end of that two-year period was Mr. Dutkewych disabled from working as an attorney? And the argument is never raised that he was incapable at that point in riding the T into work or sitting at The argument has been consistently presented in the administrative record that Mr. Dutkewych could not work at that time because of cognitive dysfunctions. He wrote Standard on April 27, 2011, about a month before benefits were terminated, in which he stressed that cognitive issues are often the most troubling for me. He added, Despite working with my therapist weekly and taking anti-depressant medications, depression and anxiety continue to be an issue. And if you examine the record from the perspective of the medical treatment and attention that was given at that time, it was all based on his cognitive difficulties.

THE COURT: And I guess -- I guess, counsel, my question is, isn't there evidence in this record that that mental condition may not be the cause but may be the symptom of

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this other physical condition, of the chronic lyme disease?

MR. MAGRATTEN: That is certainly the argument. That is certainly the argument, your Honor.

The -- if I can try to focus the dispute here a little bit, the -- really the parties are arguing on one page of the policy, of the plan. It's in administrative record, it's page 826, the provision about disability is subject to limited pay This section states that disabilities based on mental periods. disorders, which are broadly defined to be any mental, emotional, behavioral, psychological, personality, cognitive, mood or stress-related abnormality, et cetera, are limited to 24 months. There is also a restriction for chronic fatique conditions such as fibromyalgia. And there's no dispute between the parties that Standard paid two years under that provision, and from the outset Standard cautioned Mr. Dutkewych that the claim may be subject to this limited pay period. the end, Standard terminated benefits because of the limited pay period.

The key provision is at the bottom of the page, there is a provision that says, Rules for disabilities subject to limited pay periods. And what it says is if you are disabled as a result of a mental disorder or any physical disease or injury for which payment of benefits is subject to a limited pay period and at the same time are disabled as a result of a physical disease, injury or pregnancy that is not subject to

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such limitation, LTD benefits will be payable first to the conditions that are subject to the limitation. No LTD benefits will be payable after the end of the limited pay period unless on that day you continue to be disabled as a result of a physical disease, injury or pregnancy for which payment of LTD benefits is not limited.

So clearly the plaintiff's focus here is to say, Yes, my condition is a mental disorder; however, because the root cause is not just lyme disease, but chronic lyme disease, that underlying physical condition carries me beyond the two years. And they really -- this proposition rests on three -- excuse me -- the argument rests on three propositions. The first is that chronic lyme disease exists, and the plaintiff in briefs makes his argument forcefully. And I would add, as well, references to the CDC's website as of today and some other references in the brief are clearly outside the administrative record and should not be considered by this Court.

THE COURT: But even among the folks, or rather the doctors and psychologists and the other specialists here, there seems to be some disagreement. Meaning, that even putting aside any reference to materials that might be outside of the record, there seems to be some dispute among the treating doctors and the reviewing doctors about whether or not this is actually a condition; is that --

MR. MAGRATTEN: Correct. And I think the plaintiff,

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for a number of reasons, would like a judicial stamp of approval on the diagnosis of chronic lyme disease, and Standard's position is that is not an issue this Court needs to decide, it's not an issue this Court should decide. That is an issue for medical science to decide in the fullness of time on a fact record much bigger than what's presented in this case. The Court does not need to consider this because it's -- given the deferential standard of review, it's not really for the Court to weigh the evidence between --

THE COURT: No, I understand your point in regards to the deference I'm required to apply here, but here, as your sister argued, it appears that the initial application for disability benefits cited not only mental condition but this lyme disease condition, and there appears to be, based on the record, not on anything outside the record, but based on the record to be some developing opinion among at least the plaintiff's treating doctors about the effects of lyme disease.

So even without reaching the question of whether or not this diagnosis exists as a matter of medical science, isn't there enough here to say that there was an abuse of discretion in terms of treating something as a cause versus a symptom of a physical condition?

MR. MAGRATTEN: No, because of the wording of the plan. I think we're getting to the real heart of the issue here.

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The policy defines mental disorder as any mental, emotional, behavioral, psychological, personality, cognitive, mood or stress-related abnormality, et cetera. It goes through the long list, but the important qualifier says, regardless of cause, including any biological or biochemical disorder or imbalance of the brain or the presence of physical symptoms.

So let's step back and assume for the moment, yes,
Mr. Dutkewych had chronic lyme disease for sake of argument,
and let's assume that chronic lyme disease produced cognitive
dysfunction which is what prevents him from working as an
attorney today. Under the language of the definition of mental
disorder, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter.

And now we get to, I think, what is the nub of the matter that Ms. Rafik alluded to. In the brief she writes she called the disability analyst at Standard, who is not an attorney, asked the question, Well, what happens if he does have this lyme disease and it's lyme disease that's continuing, does the 24-month limitation apply? The key part of the administrative record, there are two documents I think the Court should review. One is an internal handwritten memorandum by the analyst, and that appears in administrative record at page 722, and in this handwritten memo the analyst refers to that telephone conversation. There is also a letter from Ms. Rafik to Standard, which appears in the administrative record at page 649. And if the Court looks at the two

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documents, I think the Court will conclude that it's not at all clear that Ms. Rafik and the analyst came to a common understanding of what the plan does. But even for sake of argument, let's assume the analyst said, You're correct, if lyme disease is the underlying problem, the 24-month limitation will not apply. That's not what the plan says, plainly and simply.

THE COURT: And what do you say about your sister's argument that this is a *post hoc* rationalization that I shouldn't reply upon?

MR. MAGRATTEN: This is not <u>Glista</u>; this is the plain language of the policy and the plan. The plan also provides the plan will not be amended, except in writing, signed by a senior executive of Standard, plainly not the case here. And also, if the Court examines the <u>Glista</u> case -- I'm sorry, not <u>Glista</u> -- <u>Livick v. Gillette</u>, where you have a claimant who called an administrator, received an erroneous estimate of benefits and Mr. Livick pressed his claim, and if he were to prevail, it would essentially result in a rewriting of the plan, which the 1st Circuit refused to do.

I think in the circumstances here, at best you get -the Court is presented with two different stories of what was
said in that phone conversation, and in a case of this type,
where it's fundamentally a review of the administrative record,
it's inappropriate for the Court to engage in the kind of

fact-finding to determine what was really said in that conversation.

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At the end of the day, to apply the plan as the plaintiff has asked it to be applied would require a rewriting of the plan, which contravenes a great body of ERISA jurisprudence. The ERISA jurisprudence states foremost the court's function is to apply the terms of the plan.

The relevant issue here is really the application of the limited pay provision and the rules provision at the bottom of that page. Should the Court determine that the rules provision had been inappropriately applied and that the claim should be administered beyond two years, the appropriate remedy at that point would be a remand to the administrator to consider the claim beyond the two-year period, because on this administrative record, that's all that has occurred to date, is administration of the claim through the two years.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

MR. MAGRATTEN: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. RAFIK: May I, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RAFIK: I'd like to address the policy provision, the policy language regarding the mental illness limitation.

There's two points to be made here.

First, your Honor is correct, if Mr. Dutkewych's mental illness stems from his lyme disease, then the mental

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illness limitation comes into play, but it only comes into play if Mr. Dutkewych's mental illness symptoms caused or contributed to his disability. And those are the operative words. As of June 2011, mental illness did not cause or contribute to Mr. Dutkewych's disability. He may have had symptoms of anxiety and depression, but neither Standard's doctors nor Mr. Dutkewych's doctors have ever opined that he was disabled as a result of a mental disability, whether it was caused by lyme or not.

The second point to be made is the cognitive limitations. So the policy -- the mental illness limitation very clearly says cognitive limitations, regardless of cause. That's in the language, your Honor, which is what prompted me to talk to Linda Wheeler during the internal appeals process.

Now, I appreciate that we wouldn't have been going through the entire exercise we would have been going to determine the cause of Mr. Dutkewych's symptoms if the policy was interpreted in any way that we have set forth to your Honor. But Ms. Wheeler, and I quote, says, Discussed the presence of cognitive complaints alone would not cause benefits to continue to be beyond mental disorder limitation. There would have to be evidence that these difficulties were due to a physical condition, such as a head injury, for benefits to continue. And you can replace head injury with lyme disease.

Finally, your Honor, Mr. Magratten stated that the

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entire case really revolves around Mr. Dutkewych's cognitive limitations.

As Mr. Dutkewych has repeatedly stated in his affidavits, as his doctors have repeatedly stated in their statements, and I refer you to Dr. Ruiz' report on page 1746 of the record or Dr. Raxlen's report, summary report, they list a slew of physical complaints before they even get to his cognitive disability. Mr. Dutkewych suffers from fatigue and lethargy, pain and weakness and stiffness, joint swelling and pain, joint arthritis, sleep difficulties, night sweats, weight loss, before you even get to cognitive limitations. And we have always alleged that those symptoms are independently disabling for Mr. Dutkewych.

My final point is that Paul Blatchford, an independent vocational examiner, did independent testing of Mr. Dutkewych, and what he found during that testing is that Mr. Dutkewych, who suffers from a tremor in his hand and pain and stiffness in his hand, could not use a pencil to handwrite. I would submit to your Honor that one needs their hands as an attorney to handwrite, to use a mouse, to use a computer. It was — it's — the medical evidence, the physical evidence, even if we take the cognitive out of it, your Honor, disables

Mr. Dutkewych from performing the duties of his own occupation.

THE COURT: What about your brother's final point about if I were to agree with you, the appropriate remedy is

1 remand? MS. RAFIK: Because -- actually, your Honor, there is 2 3 medical evidence in the record past the two-year point. The two-year point ended on June 2011. The Standard has in its 4 5 possession medical records through 2012, through the beginning 6 of 2012 for Mr. Dutkewych --7 THE COURT: But has it done a review of that period of 8 time? 9 MS. RAFIK: They haven't, your Honor. But I would say 03:03 10 that this happens in virtually every ERISA case, and 90 percent 11 of those cases we don't defer to a remand because The Standard hasn't had an opportunity to review updated medical records. 12 13 The proper remedy is to award retroactive benefits and 14 reinstate benefits under the terms of the plan. At that point 15 in time, the insurance company can then review medical records and determine if the individual still continues to be disabled. 16 That has been the remedy in ERISA cases since these cases 17 18 started to be litigated. And usually remand is used when 19 there's been a procedural irregularity or misapplication or 03:04 20 misinterpretation of the policy provision. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 Counsel, do you want to jump in? 23 MR. MAGRATTEN: Yes, your Honor, because the parties 24 have cross-moved. 25 THE COURT: Yes.

1 MR. MAGRATTEN: I think the argument that there is a 2 physical disability that exists as of June 2011 is a relatively 3 new argument. Yes, there are medical records in the file that talk about swollen joints and other physical issues, but that 5 is a far, far cry from substantial medical evidence that Mr. Dutkewych was unable as of that time to do the physical requirements of a sedentary job such as being an attorney. 7 8 Again, if you focus on the -- what the treating 9 physicians are concerned with at that time, I think it's 03:04 10 clearly the cognitive issues, and by Mr. Dutkewych's own 11 admission in his letter to Standard, that is his biggest 12 problem. 13 Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Thank you, counsel, for your advocacy on either side of this issue today. 16 As I indicated, I had a chance to review the papers, 17 18 but I'll go back and review them again with your arguments in 19 mind. 03:05 20 Thank you very much. 21 THE CLERK: All rise. 22 (Court adjourned at 3:05 p.m.) 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my skill and ability. /s/Debra M. Joyce May 20, 2014 Debra M. Joyce, RMR, CRR Date Official Court Reporter